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1. Introduction
The automatic integration of rapidly expanding information resources in the life sciences is 
one of the most challenging goals facing biomedical research today. Controlled vocabularies, 
terminologies, and coding systems play an important role in realizing this goal, by making it 
possible to draw together information from heterogeneous sources – for example pertaining to 
genes and proteins, drugs and diseases – secure in the knowledge that the same terms will also 
represent the same entities on all occasions of use. In the naming of genes, proteins, and other 
molecular structures, considerable efforts are under way to reduce the effects of the different 
naming conventions which have been spawned by different groups of researchers. Electronic 
patient records, too, increasingly involve the use of standardized terminologies, and 
tremendous efforts are currently being devoted to the creation of terminology resources that 
can meet the needs of a future era of personalized medicine, in which genomic and clinical 
data can be aligned in such a way that the corresponding information systems become 
interoperable. 
Unfortunately, however, these efforts are hampered by a constellation of social, psychological 
legal and other forces, whose countervailing effects are magnified by constant increases in 
available data and computing power. Patients, hospitals and governments are reluctant to 
share data; physicians are reluctant to use computerized forms in preparing patient reports; 
nurses, physicians and medical researchers in different specialities each insist on using their 
own terminologies, addressing needs which are rarely consistent with the needs of 
information integration.  
Here, however, we are concerned with obstacles of another type, which have to do with 
certain problematic design choices made thus far in the development of the data and 
information infrastructure of biomedicine. The standardization of biomedical terminologies 
has for some years been proceeding apace. Standardized terminologies in biomedicine now 
exist in many flavours, and they are becoming increasingly important in a variety of domains 
as a result of the increasing importance of computers and of the need by computers for 
regimented ways of referring to objects and processes of different kinds. The Unified Medical 
Language System (UMLS), designed to “facilitate the development of computer systems that 
behave as if they ‘understand’ the meaning of the language of biomedicine and health” (NLM 
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2004), contains over 100 such systems in its MetaThesaurus (NLM 2004a), which 
comprehends some 3 million medical and biological terminological units. Yet very many of 
these systems are, as we shall see, constructed in such a way as to hamper the progress of 
biomedical informatics. 
2. International Standard Bad Philosophy 
Interestingly, and fatefully, many of the core features which serve as obstacles to the 
information alignment that we seek can be traced back to the influence of a single man, Eugen 
Wüster (1898-1977), a Viennese saw-manufacturer, professor of woodworking machinery, 
and devotee of Esperanto, whose singular importance turns on the fact that it was he who, in 
the middle of the last century, founded the technical committee devoted to terminology 
standardization of the International Organization for Standardization (ISO). Wüster was 
almost single-handedly responsible for all of the seminal documents put forth by this 
committee, and his ideas have served as the basis for almost all work in terminology 
standardization ever since.  
ISO is a quasi-legal institution, in which earlier standards play a normative role in the 
formulation of standards which come later. The influence of Wüster’s ideas has thus been 
exerted in ever wider circles into the present day, and it continues to make itself felt in many 
of the standards being promulgated by ISO not only in the realm of terminology but also in 
fields such as healthcare and computing.  
Unfortunately these ideas, which have apparently never been subjected to criticism by those 
involved in ISO’s work, can only be described as a kind of International Standard Bad 
Philosophy. Surveying these ideas will thus provide us with some important insights into a 
hitherto unnoticed practical role played by considerations normally confined to the domain of 
academic philosophy, and will suggest ways in which a good philosophy of language can help 
us develop and nurture better scientific terminologies in the future. 
We surmise further that Wüster’s ideas, or very similar ideas which arose independently, 
could be embraced by so many in the fields of artificial intelligence, knowledge modelling, 
and nowadays in Semantic Web computing, because the simplification in our understanding 
of the nexus of mind, language and reality which they represent answers deep needs on the 
side of computer and information scientists. In subjecting Wüster’s ideas to critical analysis, 
therefore, we shall also be making a contribution to a much larger project of exploring 
possibilities for improvement in the ways in which computers are used in our lives. 
3. Terminologies and Concept Orientation 
The thinking of ISO Technical Committee (TC) 37 is that of the so-called Vienna School of 
Terminology, of which Wüster (1991) and Felber (1984) are principal movement texts (for a 
survey see Temmerman (2000, chapter 1)). Terminology, for Wüster and Felber, starts out 
from what are called concepts. The document ISO CD 704.2 N 133 95 EN, which bears the 
stamp of Wüster’s thinking, explains what concepts are in psychological terms. When we 
experience reality, we confront two kinds of objects: the concrete, such as a tree or a machine, 
and the abstract, such as society, complex facts, or processes: 
As soon as we are confronted with several objects similar to each other (all the planets in the solar system, all the 
bridges or societies in the world), certain essential properties common to these objects can be identified as 
characteristics of the general concept. These characteristics are used to delimit concepts. On the communicative 
level, these concepts are described by definitions and represented by terms, graphic symbols, etc. (ISO CD 704.2 
N 133 95 EN) 
A concept itself, we read in the same text, is “a unity of thought made up of characteristics 
that are derived by categorizing objects having a number of identical properties.” To 
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understand this and the many similar sentences in 150 documents, we need to understand 
what is meant by ‘characteristic’. On the one hand, again in the same ISO text, we are told 
that a characteristic is a property that we identify as common to a set of objects. In other texts 
of ISO, however (for example in ISO 1087-1), we are told that a characteristic is a “mental 
representation” of such a property. This uneasy straddling of the boundary between world and 
mind, between property and its mental representation, is a feature of all of ISO’s work on 
terminology, as it was a feature of Wüster’s own thinking. Terminology work is seen as 
providing clear delineations of concepts in terms of characteristics as thus (confusingly) 
defined. When such delineations have been achieved, then terms can be assigned to the 
corresponding concepts. Wüster talks in this connection of a ‘realm’ (Reich) of concepts and 
of a ‘realm’ of terms (Wüster 1991, p. 1), the goal being that each term in a terminology 
should be associated with one single concept through “permanent assignment” (Felber 1984, 
p. 182).  
4. Problems with the Concept-Based View of Terminologies 
The above should seem alien to those familiar with the domain of medicine, however, because 
there we often have to deal with classes of entities for which we are unable to identify 
characteristics which all their members share in common. Terms are often introduced for such 
classes of entities long before we have any clear delineation of some corresponding concept. 
The reason for this miscalibration between the ISO view of terminology and the ways terms in 
medicine are actually used turns on the fact that the notion of concept which underlies the 
terminology standards of ISO TC 37 and its successors has nothing to do with medicine at all. 
As Temmerman points out (2000, p. 11), Wüster was ‘an engineer and a businessman ... 
active in the field of standardisation’ and was concerned primarily with the standardisation of 
products, entities of the sort which truly are such as to manifest characteristics identifiable in 
encounters of similars because they have been manufactured as such. Vocabulary itself is 
treated by Wüster and his TC 37 followers ‘as if it could be standardised in the same way as 
types of paint and varnish’ (Temmerman, p. 12).  
In those areas – like manufacturing or trade – which were uppermost in the mind of Wüster 
and of TC37 in its early incarnations, the primary purpose of standardization is precisely to 
bring about a situation in which entities in reality (such as machine parts) are required to 
conform to certain agreed-upon standards. Such a requirement is of course quite alien to the 
world of medicine, where it is in every case the entities in reality which must serve as our 
guide and benchmark. However, even in medicine – for reasons which increasingly have to do 
not only with ISO edicts but also with the expectations of those involved in the development 
of software applications – terminologists have been encouraged to focus not on entities in 
reality but rather on the concepts putatively associated therewith. The latter, it is held, enjoy 
the signal advantage that they can be conveyed as input to computers. At the same time they 
can be identified as units of knowledge and thus serve as the basis for what is called 
‘knowledge modelling’, a term which itself embodies what we believe is a fateful confusion 
of knowledge with the true and false beliefs to which, in a domain like medicine, many of the 
concepts in common use correspond.  
Some critical remarks about certain conceptions in ISO TC 37 documents have been recently 
advanced (Areblad and Fogelberg 2003), and the proposed alternative certainly represents an 
advance on Wüster in its treatment of individual objects. As concerns what is general, 
however, this new work still runs together objects and concepts, identifying specific kinds or 
types of phenomena in the world with the general concepts created by human beings. In this 
way, like Wüster, it leaves itself with no benchmark in relation to which given concepts or 
concept-systems could be established as correct or incorrect. Moreover, it leaves no way of 
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doing justice to the fact that bacteria would still have properties different from those of trees 
even if there were no humans able to form the corresponding concepts.  
 
The Kantian Confusion 
 
We can get at the roots of the problem of Wüsterian thinking if we examine what ISO CD 
704.2 N 133 95 EN has to say about individual particulars and the proper names associated 
with them: 
If we discover or create a singular phenomenon (individual object, e.g., the planet Saturn, The Golden Gate 
Bridge, the society of a certain country), we form an individual concept in order to think about that object. For 
communication purposes we assign names to individual concepts so that we can talk or write about them. 
When parents assign names to their children, according to this view, and when they use such 
names for purposes of communication with others they are not talking about their children at 
all. Rather, they are talking about certain individual concepts which they have formed in their 
minds. This confusion of objects and concepts is well known in the history of philosophy. It is 
called “Kantianism”. 
Wüster and Felber and (sadly) very many of the proponents of concept-based terminology 
work who have followed in their wake, as also very many of those working in the field of 
what is called ‘knowledge representation’, are subject to this same Kantian confusion. One 
implication of the fact that one is unsure about whether one is dealing with objects or with 
concepts is that one writes unclearly. This, for example, is how Felber in his semi-official text 
on terminology (presenting ideas incorporated in relevant ISO terminology standards) defines 
what he calls a ‘part-whole definition’:  
The description of the collocation of individual objects revealing their partitive relationships corresponds to the 
definition of concepts. Such a description may concern the composite. In this case the parts, of the composite are 
enumerated. It may, however, also concern a part. In this case the relationship to an individual object subordinate 
to the composite and the adjoining parts are indicated. (Felber, op. cit., cited exactly as printed) 
 
The Realist Alternative 
 
The alternative to Kantianism in the history of philosophy is called realism, and we have 
argued in a series of papers that the improvement of biomedical terminologies and coding 
systems must rest on the use of a realist ontology as basis (Smith 2004, Fielding et al 2004, 
Simon et al. in press). Realist ontology is not merely able to help in detecting errors and in 
ensuring intuitive principles for the creation and maintenance of coding systems of a sort that 
can help to prevent errors in the future. More importantly still, it can help to ensure that the 
coding systems and terminologies developed for different purposes can be provided with a 
clear documentation (thus helping to avoid many types of errors), and that they can be made 
compatible with each other (thus supporting information integration). Note that we say 
‘realist ontology’ (or alternatively, with Rosse and Mejino (2003), ‘reference ontology’) in 
order to distinguish ontology on our understanding from the various related things which go 
by this name in contexts such as knowledge representation and conceptual modelling. 
Ontology, as conceived from the realist perspective, is not a software implementation or a 
controlled vocabulary. Rather, it is a theory of reality, a ‘science of what is, of the kinds and 
structures of objects, properties, events, processes and relations in every area of reality’ 
(Smith 2003). It is for our purposes here a theory of those higher-level categories which 
structure the biomedical domain, the representation of which needs to be both unified and 
coherent if it is to serve as the basis for terminologies and coding systems that have the 
requisite degree and type of interoperability.  
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Ontology in this realist sense is already being used as a means of finding inconsistencies in 
terminologies and clinical knowledge representations such as SNOMED (Ceusters W, Smith 
B. 2003; Ceusters et al. 2004; Bodenreider et al. 2005), the Gene Ontology (Smith, Köhler 
and Kumar 2004), or the National Cancer Institute Thesaurus (Ceusters, Smith and Goldberg, 
in press). The method has also proved useful in drawing attention to certain problematic 
features of the HL7 RIM, more precisely on its confused running together of  acts, statements 
about acts, and the reports in which such statements are registered (Vizenor 2004). This 
makes the HL7 RIM inadequate as a model for electronic patient records (so that it is to be 
regretted that experiments in this direction are already taking place). On the positive side, it 
has been embraced by the Foundational Model of Anatomy and by the Open Biomedical 
Ontologies Consortium as a means whereby precise formal definitions can be provided for the 
top-level categories and relations used in terminologies, in a way that will both support 
automatic reasoning and be intelligible to those with no expertise in formal methods (Smith et 
al., 2005). 
 
5. Formal methods for coding systems 
Biomedical terminologies or coding systems can be integrated together into larger systems, or 
used effectively within an EHR system (which means: without loss or corruption of 
information), only on the basis of a shared common framework of top-level ontological 
categories. Often one talks in this connection merely of the sort of regimentation that can be 
ensured through the use of languages such as XML, or through technologies such as RDF(S) 
(W3C 2004) or OWL (W3C 2004a) – ontology languages that currently enjoy wide support 
through their association with the Semantic Web project.  
On closer inspection, however, one discovers that the ‘semantics’ that comes with languages 
like RDF(S) and OWL is restricted to that sort of specification of meaning that can be 
effected using the formal technique of mathematical model theory. This means that meanings 
are specified by associating with the terms and sentences of a language certain abstract set-
theoretic structures in line with the understanding of semantics that has followed in the wake 
of Alfred Tarski’s ‘semantic’ definition of truth for artificial languages (Hodges n.d.). Model 
theory allows us to describe the minimal conditions that a world must satisfy in order for a 
‘meaning’ (or ‘interpretation’ in the model-theoretic sense) to be assignable to every 
expression in an artificial language with certain formal properties. Unfortunately, however, 
entities in reality are hereby substituted by abstract mathematical constructs embodying only 
the properties shared in common by all such interpretations. A formal semantic theory makes 
as few assumptions as possible about the actual nature or intrinsic structure of the entities in 
an interpretation, in order to retain as much generality as possible. In consequence, however, 
the chief utility of such a theory is not to provide any deep analysis (or indeed any analysis at 
all) of the nature of the entities – for example of the biomedical kinds and instances – 
described by the language. Rather, the power of formal semantics resides at the logical level, 
above all in providing a technical way to determine which inferences are valid (Guha and 
Hayes 2002). 
In our view, in contrast, the job of ‘semantics’ as this term is used in phrases such as 
‘semantic interoperability’ is identical to that of ontology as traditionally understood. Thus it 
does not consist in the construction of simplified models for testing the validity of inferences. 
Rather, its task is to support the alignment of the different perspectives on reality embodied in 
different types of coding and classification systems; to this end it must provide us with a 
common reference framework which mirrors the structures of those entities in reality to which 
these different perspectives relate. 
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6. Basic Formal Ontology 
One such reference framework, which has been developed by the Institute of Formal 
Ontology and Medical Information Science in Saarbrücken,  is Basic Formal Ontology (BFO) 
(Grenon and Smith 2004, Grenon et al. 2004), one of several closely related ontological 
theories proposed in the recent literature of realist ontology (for a survey and comparison see 
Masolo et al. 2004). BFO rests on the idea that it is necessary to develop an ontology that 
remains as close as possible to widely shared intuitions about objects and processes in reality. 
It consists in a number of sub-ontologies, the most important of which are:  
• SNAP, ontologies indexed by time instants and analogous to instantaneous snapshots 
of what exists at a given instant 
• SPAN, ontologies indexed by time intervals and analogous to videoscopic 
representations of the processes unfolding across a given interval  
– corresponding to the fundamental division between continuants (entities, such as organisms 
or blood corpuscles, which endure self-identically through time), and occurrents (processes, 
such as heart bypass surgeries or increases in temperature, which can be divided along the 
temporal axis into successive phases). Each SNAP ontology is a partition of the totality of 
objects and their continuant qualities, roles, functions, etc., existing in a given domain of 
reality at a given time. Each SPAN ontology is a partition of the totality of processes 
unfolding themselves in a given domain across a given temporal interval. SNAP and SPAN 
are complementary in the sense that, while continuants alone are visible in the SNAP view 
and the occurrents in which they are involved are visible only in the SPAN view, continuants 
and occurrents themselves exist only in mutual dependence on each other. 
SNAP and SPAN serve as the basis for a series of sub-ontologies at different levels of 
granularity reflecting the fact that the same portion of reality can be apprehended in an 
ontology at a plurality of different levels of coarser or finer grain from whole organisms to 
single molecules. What appears as a single object at one level may appear as a complex 
aggregate of smaller objects at another level. What is a tumour at one level may appear as an 
aggregate of cells or molecules at another level. What counts as a unitary process at one level 
may be part of a process-continuum at another level. Since no single ontology can 
comprehend the whole of reality at all levels of granularity, each of the ontologies here 
indicated is thus partial only (Kumar et al. 2004). 
Dependent entities, both within the SNAP and within the SPAN ontologies, are entities 
which require some other entity or entities which serve as their bearers. Dependent entities 
can be divided further into relational (for entities – such as processes of infection – dependent 
on a plurality of bearers) and non-relational (for entities – such as a rise in temperature – 
dependent on a single bearer). 
Processes are examples of dependent entities on the side of occurrents: they exist always only 
as processes of or in some one or more independent continuants which are their bearers. 
Qualities, roles, functions, shapes, dispositions, and powers are examples of dependent 
entities on the side of continuants: they exist always only as the qualities (etc.) of specific 
independent continuants as their bearers: a smile smiles only in a human face; the function of 
your heart exists only when your heart exists. 
Universals and particulars: Entities in all categories in the BFO ontology exist both as 
universals and particulars. You are a particular human being, and you instantiate the universal 
human being; you have a particular temperature, which instantiates the universal temperature; 
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you are currently engaging in a particular reading act, which instantiates the universal reading 
act. In each case we have a certain universal and an associated plurality of instances, where 
the term ‘instance’ should be understood here in a non-technical way, to refer simply to those 
objects, events and other entities which we find around us in the realm of space and time (and 
thus not, for example, to entries, records or values in databases). ‘Universal’, too, connotes 
something very simple, namely the general kinds or patterns which such particular entities 
have in common. Thus to talk of the universal red is just to talk of that which this tomato and 
that pool of ink share in common; to talk of the universal aspirin is to talk of that which these 
aspirin pills and those portions of aspirin powder share in common. That universals in this 
sense exist should be uncontroversial: it is universals which are investigated by science. It is 
in virtue of the existence of universals that medical diagnoses are able to be formulated by 
using general terms, and that corresponding standardized therapies can be tested in application 
to pluralities of different cases (instances) existing at different times and locations (Swoyer 
1999). 
Again, in part because of the influence of Wüsterian thinking, both universals and particulars 
have been poorly treated in biomedical terminologies and in electronic health records thus far. 
While biomedical terminologies ought properly to be constructed as inventories of the 
universals in the corresponding domains of reality (Smith et al. 2005), they have been 
conceived instead as representations of the concepts in peoples’ heads. While electronic 
health records ought properly to be constructed as inventories of the instances salient to the 
health care of each given patient (including particular disorders, lesions, treatments, etc.), they 
have in fact been put together in such a way that in practice only human beings (patients, 
physicians, family members) are represented on the level of instances, information about all 
other particular entities being entered in the form of general codes – in ways which cause the 
problems outlined in (Ceusters and Smith 2005). Instances have also been inadequately 
treated in the various logical tools used in the fields of terminology and EHR. (The Tarskian 
approach referred to above encourages, again, the logical treatment, not of actual particular 
entities in corporeal reality, but rather of those abstract mathematical surrogates for such 
entities which are created ad hoc for the logician’s technical purposes.) 
Ontology and epistemology: The BFO framework distinguishes, further, between ontology 
and epistemology. The former is concerned with reality itself, the latter with our ways of 
gaining knowledge of reality. These ways of gaining knowledge can themselves be subjected 
to ontological treatment: they are processes of a certain sort, with cognitive agents as their 
continuant bearers. This fact, however, should not lead us to confuse epistemological issues 
(pertaining to what and how we can know) with ontological issues (pertaining to how the 
world is). Thus ‘finding’ is a term which belongs properly not to ontology but rather to 
epistemology, and so also do UMLS terms such as ‘experimental model of disease’. It is the 
failure to distinguish clearly between ontology and epistemology – a failure that is 
comparable in its magnitude to the failure to distinguish, say, between physics and its history 
or between eating and the description of food) – which is at the root of the confusions in 
Wüster/ISO thinking, and in almost all contemporary work on terminologies and knowledge 
representation and which leads for example to the identification of blood pressure with result 
of laboratory measurement or of individual allele with observation of individual alleles. 
Already a very superficial analysis of a coding system like the ICD (for: International 
Classification of Diseases: World Health Organization, n.d.) reveals that this system is not in 
fact a classification of diseases as entities in reality (Bodenreider et al. 2004). Rather it is a 
classification of statements on the part of a physician about disease phenomena which the 
physician might attribute to a patient. As an example, the ICD-10 class B83.9: Helminthiasis, 
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unspecified does not refer (for example) to a disease caused by a worm belonging to the 
species unspecified (some special and hitherto uninvestigated sub-species of Acanthocephalia 
or Metastrongylia). Rather, it refers to a statement (perhaps appearing in some patient record) 
made by a physician who for whatever reason did not specify the actual type of Helminth 
which caused the disease the patient was suffering from. Neither OWL nor reasoners using 
models expressed in OWL would complain about making the class B83.9: Helminthiasis, 
unspecified a subclass of B83: Other helminthiasis; from the point of view of a coherent 
ontology, however, such a view is nonsense: it rests, again, on the confusion between 
ontology and epistemology. 
A similar confusion can be found in EHR architectures, model specifications, message 
specifications or data types for EHR systems. References to a patient’s gender/sex are a 
typical example (Milton 2004). Some specifications, such as the Belgian KMEHR system for 
electronic healthcare records (Kmehr-Bis, n.d.) include a classification of what is called 
“administrative sex” (we leave it to the reader to determine what this term might actually 
mean). The possible specifications of administrative sex are then female, male, unknown, or 
changed. Unknown, here, does not refer to a new and special type of gender (reflecting some 
novel scientific discovery); rather it refers merely (but of course confusingly) to the fact that 
the actual gender is not documented in the record.  
7. An Ontological Basis for Coding Systems and the Electronic Health Record 
Applying BFO to coding systems and EHR architectures means, in the first place, applying it 
to the salient entities in reality – to actual patients, diseases, therapies – with the goal of 
making coding systems more coherent, both internally and in their relation to the EHRs which 
they were designed to support. But it is essential to this endeavour that we establish also the 
proper place in reality of coding systems and EHRs themselves, and that we understand their 
nature and their purposes in light of a coherent ontological theory. Coding systems are in fact 
as real as the words we speak or write and as the patterns in our brains, and we can use the 
resources of a framework like BFO in order to analyze how both coding systems and EHRs 
relate a single reality in a way which is compatible with what is known informally by the 
patients, physicians, nurses, etc. toward whom they are directed.  
Referent tracking is a new paradigm for achieving the faithful registration of patient data in 
electronic health records, focusing on what is happening on the side of the patient (Ceusters 
W., Smith B. 2005a) rather than on statements made by clinicians (Rector et al. 1991). The 
goal of referent tracking is to create an ever-growing pool of data relating to concrete entities 
in reality. In the context of Electronic Healthcare Records (EHRs) the relevant concrete 
entities, i.e. particulars as described above, are not only particular patients but also their body 
parts, diseases, therapies, lesions, and so forth, insofar as these are relevant to their diagnosis 
and treatment. Within a referent tracking system (RTS), all such entities are referred to 
explicitly, something which cannot be achieved when familiar concept-based systems are 
used in what is called “clinical coding” (Ceusters W., Smith B. 2005b).   
By fostering the accumulation of prodigious amounts of instance-level data along these lines, 
including also considerable quantities of redundant information (since the same information 
about given instances will often be entered independently by different physicians), which can 
be used for cross-checking, the paradigm allows for a better use of coding and classification 
systems in patient records by minimizing the negative impact that mistakes in these systems 
have on the interpretation of the data. 
The users who enter information in a RTS will be required to use IUIs (Instance Unique 
Indentifiers) in order to assure explicit reference to the particulars about which the 
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information is provided. Thus the information that is currently captured in the EHR by means 
of sentences such as: “this patient has a left elbow fracture”, would in the future be conveyed 
by means of descriptions such as “#IUI-5089 is located in #IUI-7120”, together with 
associated information for example to the effect that “IUI-7120” refers to the patient under 
scrutiny or that “IUI-5089” refers to a particular fracture in patient #IUI-7120 (and not to 
some similar left elbow fracture from which he suffered earlier). The RTS must 
correspondingly contain information relating particulars to universals, such as “#IUI-5089 is a 
fracture” (where ‘fracture’ might be replaced by a unique identifier pointing to the 
representation of the universal fracture in an ontology).  Of course, EHR systems that endorse 
the referent tracking paradigm should have mechanisms to capture such information in an 
easy and intuitive way, including mechanisms to translate generic statements into the intended 
concrete form, which may itself operate primarily behind the scenes, so that the IUIs 
themselves remain invisible to the human user. One could indeed imagine that natural 
language processing software will one day be in a position to replace in a reliable fashion the 
generic terms in a sentence with corresponding IUIs for the particulars at issue, with the need 
for manual support flagged only in problematic cases. This is what users already expect from 
EHR systems in which data are entered by resorting to general codes or terms from coding 
systems. 
If the paradigm of referent tracking is to be brought into existence, at least the following 
requirements have to be addressed: 
• a mechanism for generating IUIs that are guaranteed to be unique strings;  
• a procedure for deciding what particulars should receive IUIs; 
• protocols for determining whether or not a particular has already been assigned a IUI 
(except for some exceptional configurations that are beyond the scope of this paper, 
each particular should receive maximally one IUI); 
• practices governing the use of IUIs in the EHR (issues concerning the syntax and 
semantics of statements containing IUIs); 
• methods for determining the truth values of propositions that are expressed through 
descriptions in which IUIs are used; 
• methods for correcting errors in the assignment of IUIs, and for investigating the 
results of assigning alternative IUIs to problematic cases;  
• methods for taking account of changes in the reality to which IUIs get assigned, for 
example when particulars merge or split. 
An RTS can be set up in isolation, for instance within a single general practitioner’s surgery 
or within the context of a hospital. The referent tracking paradigm will however serve its 
purpose optimally only when it is used in a distributed, collaborative environment. One and 
the same patient is often cared for by a variety of healthcare providers, many of them working 
in different settings, and each of these settings uses its own information system. These 
systems contain different data, but the majority of these data provide information about the 
same particulars. It is currently very hard, if not impossible, to query these data in such a way 
that, for a given particular, all information available can be retrieved. With the right sort of 
distributed RTS, such retrieval becomes a trivial matter. 
This, in turn, will have a positive impact on the future of biomedicine in a number of different 
ways. Errors will be more easily eliminated or prevented via reminders or alerts issued by 
software agents responding to changes in the referent tracking database. It will also become 
possible to coordinate patient care between multiple care organisations in more efficient ways. 
An RTS will also do a much better job in fulfilling the goals of the ICD and its precursors, 
namely to enable information integration for public health. It can help specifically in the 
 10
domain of disease surveillance, an area of vital concern on a global scale that has the potential 
not only to improve the quality of care but also to provide a means for controling costs, in 
particular by promoting effective cooperation among healthcare professionals for continuity 
of care.  
 
8. Toward the Future 
European and international efforts towards standardization of biomedical terminology and 
electronic healthcare records have been focused over the last 15 years primarily on syntax. 
Semantic standardization has been restricted to issues pertaining to knowledge representation 
(and resting primarily on the application of set-theoretic model theory, along the lines 
described in section 5. above). Moves in these directions are indeed required, and the results 
obtained thus far are of value both for the advance of science and for some concrete uses of 
healthcare informatics applications. But we can safely say that the syntactical issues are now 
in essence resolved. The semantic problems relating to biomedical terminology (polysemy, 
synonymy, cross-mapping of terminologies, and so forth), too, are well understood – at least 
in the community of specialized researchers. Now, however, it is time to solve these problems 
by using the theories and tools that have been developed so far, and that have been tested 
under laboratory conditions (Simon et al. 2004). This means using the right sort of ontology, 
i.e. an ontology that is able explicitly and unambiguously to relate coding systems, biomedical 
terminologies and electronic health care records (including their architecture) to the 
corresponding instances in reality. 
To do this properly will require a huge effort, since the relevant standards need to be reviewed 
and overhauled by experts who are familiar with the appropriate sorts of ontological thinking 
(which will require some corresponding effort in training and education). Even before that 
stage is reached, however, there is the problem of making all constituent parties – including 
patients (or at least the organizations that represent them), healthcare providers, system 
developers and decision makers – aware of how deep-seated the existing problems are. 
Having been overwhelmed by the exaggerated claims on behalf of XLM and similar silver 
bullets of recent years, they must be informed that XML, or Descriptive Logic, or OWL, or 
even the entire Semantic Web, can take us only so far. And of course we must also be careful 
to avoid associating similarly exaggerated expectations with realist ontology itself. It, too, can 
take us only so far. 
The message of realist ontology is that, while there are various different views of the world, 
this world itself is one, and that this one world, because of its immense complexity, is 
accessible to us only by a corresponding variety of different sorts of views. It is our belief that 
it is only through reference to this world that the various different views can be compared and 
made compatible (and not by reference to ethereal entities in some ‘realm of concepts’). To 
allow clinical data registered in electronic patient records by means of coding (and/or 
classification) systems to be used for further automated processing, it should be crystal clear 
whether entities in the coding system refer to diseases or to statements made about diseases, 
to acts on the part of physicians or to documents in which such acts are recorded, to 
procedures and observations or to statements about procedures or observations. As such, the 
coding systems used in electronic healthcare records should be associated with a precise and 
formally rigorous ontology that is coherent with the ontology of the healthcare record as well 
as with those dimensions of the real world that are described therein. And they should be 
consistent, also, not with information models concocted by database designers from afar, but 
rather with the common-sense intuitions about the objects and processes in reality which are 
shared by patients and healthcare providers. 
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9. Recommendations 
Concrete recommendations for further progress thus include the following: 
1. Given that most existing international standards in terminology and related fields were 
created at a time when the requirements for good ontologies and good controlled 
vocabularies were not yet clear, efforts should be made to inform people of the urgent 
need for more up-to-date and more coherent standards.  
2. The work of ISO TC 37 (on terminologies) and of the technical committees which 
have fallen under its sway (CEN/TC251, ISO/TC215, etc.) should be subjected to a 
radical evaluation from the point of view of coherence of method, intelligibility of 
documentation, consistency of views expressed, usability of proposed standards, 
methods for testing, and quality assurance.  
3. Through collaboration between users and developers, objective measures should be 
developed for the quality of ontologies. 
4. By applying these quality measures, a publicly available top-level ontology should be 
developed on the basis of consensus among the major groups involved in biomedical 
ontology development, almost all of whom are present within the EU; this top-level 
ontology should be complemented with extensions for biomedicine and bio-
informatics. 
5. Objective measures should be developed for ascertaining the quality of tools designed 
for the support of information integration in such a way that, when resources are 
invested in the development of ontologies and associated software in the future, clear 
thresholds of success can be formulated and corresponding standards of accountability 
imposed. 
6. Existing terminologies and ontologies should be assessed for their compatibility with 
the major top-level ontologies, and efforts should be devoted to ensuring such 
compatibility in the future.  
7. Principles should be established setting forth the appropriate use of ontologies in EHR 
systems, including investigations of the merits of systems which, in addition to general 
terms from coding systems, also incorporate reference to particulars in a systematic 
way. 
8. The ontological mistakes in the HL7 RIM should be thoroughly documented and 
modifications should be proposed to make the HL7 approach consistent with a faithful 
treatment of the different kinds of entities that exist in the domain of healthcare and 
are relevant for patient data collection and for the communication of information 
content between healthcare institutions. 
9. A Europe-wide institution should be developed for the coordination of ontology 
research and knowledge transfer in order to promote high-quality work and to avoid 
redundancy in investment of ontology-building efforts. Open competitions should be 
developed which are designed to find the best methodologies for harvesting healthcare 
data, with real gold standards and real measures of success governing applications of 
the results to clinical care and public health, integration with genomics-based data to 




10. Conclusion  
We have argued that what is needed if we are to support the kind of information integration to 
which we all aspire is not more or better information models but rather a theory of the reality 
to which both coding systems and electronic health records are directed.  
Applying a sound realist ontology to coding systems and to EHR architectures means in the 
first place ensuring that the latter are calibrated not to the denizens of Wüster’s ‘realm of 
concepts’ but rather to those entities in reality – such as particular patients, diseases, therapies, 
surgical acts, and the universals which they instantiate – which form the subject matter of 
healthcare. In this way we can make coding systems more coherent, both internally and in 
their relation to the EHRs which they are designed to support, and externally in relation to the 
patients, physicians, nurses, etc. toward whom they are directed.  
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